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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID BURT, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 890190CA 
vs. : 
BETTY MAE BURT, : Priority: 14b 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Appellant's basic claim on appeal is that the Trial Court 
did not properly divide the marital property of the parties and in 
particular, gave the Respondent an interest in her earnings on 
inherited funds. The Trial Court had broad equitable discretion 
in domestic relations matters and such equitable awards as were 
made in this case should not be overturned on appeal unless the 
Court acted arbitrarily or capriciously or where it is apparent by 
a proponderance that the Trial Court misapplied the law or the 
facts in determining a division of the property. 
A thorough reading of the facts presented at the Trial support 
the Trial Court's conclusion and demonstrates that the Court 
attempted to equalize the parties after a forty (40) year marriage 
as much as possible. The Trial Court had both evidentiary and 
legal support for its decision and there is no evidence which 
clearly preponderates against a Trial Court decision and therefore, 
this Court should not substitute its Judgment for that of the Trial 
Court. 
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BETTY MAE BURT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890190CA 
Priority: 14b 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Respondent has no quarrel with Appellant's Statement of 
Jurisdiction and the matter is properly before this Court pursuant 
to Section 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Respondent has no quarrel with Appellant's recitation of the 
Nature of Proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
The gravamen of all the issues raised by the Appellant in this 
appeal can be reduced to one fairly simple issue and that is, 
whether or not the Trial Court Judge abused his discretion in 
making certain financial awards to the parties. 
The Appellant has chosen to address a variety of issues, but 
in the pure sense, the only issue that existed between these 
parties at the time of the divorce, was a division of the marital 
property and a provision for the payment of debts and for the 
ongoing support of each party. 
These financial decisions were made by the Court following a 
full hearing and the only issue properly before the Court is 
whether or not the Judge, who has great equitable latitude in these 
matters, abused that discretion. 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
The Appellant filed a Divorce Complaint as the Plaintiff on 
April 24, 1987 and three (3) days thereafter, the Respondent filed 
a Divorce Complaint as Plaintiff. Two (2) cases were consolidated 
with the Appellant being listed as the Defendant and Respondent as 
the Plaintiff. (See Tp. 1-8) 
Thereafter, temporary Orders, based upon an Order To Show 
Cause were filed in the case and a Pretrial Settlement Conference 
was held between the parties before the Domestic Relations 
Commissioner, Maurice Richards. The matter was heard on June 24, 
1988, at which time Financial Declarations were being submitted, 
Proposed Settlements and testimony was taken and the Commissioner, 
issued a Recommended Order to the Court included inter alia a 
ruling that the increase of the Defendant's inheritance was a 
marital asset and therefore, was subject to an equitable division 
of marital property in the proceedings and that the home purchased 
by the Defendant using those proceeds was also therefore, a marital 
asset. (See Recommended Order of Commissioner. Volume 1 Record on 
Appeal) 
The Appellant objected to that recommendation and the case was 
set for Trial on January 20, 1989. At the Trial both parties 
testified, exhibits were reviewed and the Court issued a Memorandum 
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Decision on February 8, 1989, upon which Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce were submitted, which were 
ultimately signed by the Judge on March 2, 1989. The Appellant 
filed her Notice of Appeal on the 28th day of March, 1989 to this 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Respondent has reviewed Appellant's Statement of the Facts 
on Page 4, 5 and 6 of Appellant's Brief. This does not give a 
complete factual picture that was presented to the Court, both at 
the time of the hearing before the Domestic Relations Commissioner 
and the hearing before the Trial Judge that are critical to a 
determination of this appeal. Therefore, Respondent will submit 
his own Statement. 
Appellant and Respondent were married on the 5th day of March, 
1947 in Idaho Falls, Idaho. At the time of their divorce they had 
been married approximately 42 years. (See Tp. 1) The parties bed 
two (2) children born as issue of their marriage, both of whom had 
reached the age of majority by the time of Trial. 
In the early part of the parties marriage, from approximately 
1947 until the early 1960!s, the Respondent was the primary income 
producer of the parties. (See Tp. 89) He was employed by the 
Federal Government and also maintained a part-time, in the home, 
watch repair business. (See Tp. 60) During this period of time 
the Appellant did not work, but spent her primary time with the 
children in raising them. The Respondent however, paid the 
mortgage payment on the home and all of the household expenses. 
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(See Tp. 92) 
Beginning in the early 1960fs, as the children reached teenage 
years, the Appellant began work at Whitehead Electric Company in 
Ogden, first on a part-time basis, working into a full-time 
position by the late 1960fs, a position which she held until her 
retirement in 1987. During this time Appellant made approximately 
the same amount of money as the Respondent. Respondent retired in 
1976 (Tp. 60) and began receiving his retirement on a monthly 
basis. 
During this period of time, in approximately 1969 and 1972, 
at the time of the death of Appellant's parents, she received an 
inheritance from them in the sum of $71,600. Appellant then 
proceeded over the next fifteen (15) years to invest that money in 
stocks, bonds, CDfs and other investment devises, while the 
Respondent continued to work and pay the monthly mortgage payment 
on the home and the basic household expenses. (See Tp. 178) 
Essentially, the Appellant was allowed to take her money and 
use it for her own purposes. In most cases, buying expensive curio 
type items and indulging in her own private acquisition program. 
The Respondent however, continued to provide for the basic 
necessities for the parties. Although during this time the 
Appellant did make some improvements on the home, this was really 
her only contribution to the day to day living expenses of the 
parties. 
The Judge summed it up best in his Memorandum Decision when 
he indicated that "the marital arrangement of the parties was 
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unique in that it created a situation of "what was hers was hers 
and what was his was theirs11". (See Page 2 of the Memorandum 
Decision) 
By the time of the divorce the Respondent was receiving the 
sum of $1350 per month from his Federal Retirement. Although the 
Court found that he had an additional monthly income of 
approximately $616, this was primarily from the rental of his 
mother!s home, which had been given to he and his brother and a 
small amount of money from his watch business. The income from the 
Respondent's watch business had steadily deteriorated to the time 
of Trial, primarily because all Respondent's equipment was aged and 
his business was geared to fixing mechanical watches, rather than 
the quartz watches which now form the bulk of the watch sales. 
(See Tp. 61-73) 
The Appellant on the other hand, parlayed her $71,000 
inheritance in to a small fortune, the sum of approximately 
$195,340, while the Appellant continued to provide for she and the 
family. Appellant used this money to purchase a new home and kept 
the balance in a variety of investment accounts by the time of the 
divorce. 
The Appellant also retired from her work at Whitehead Electric 
and although she was not receiving retirement income, received $415 
from Social Security, $515 from interest in dividends on her 
remaining funds and $185 from an IRA for a total monthly income of 
$1,115 at the time of the divorce. (See Tp. Ill) 
At the time of the divorce, the Respondent was living in the 
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parties home. The Appellant was living in the home she had 
purchased from her invested funds. Neither party was working. The 
Respondent had very little income from his watch business, both 
essentially were retired, living on the incomes that they had each 
made, either through retirement or investments, were living in 
separate residences and each maintaining separate property. 
The Court was then called upon to divide the property and make 
appropriate financial arrangements between the parties, which it 
did following a complete hearing on the matter where both parties 
testified, numerous documents were received and the Court was fully 
advised as to their financial status. 
The Court took the matter under advisement for a period of 
approximately two (2) weeks, issued a Memorandum Decision, making 
and equitable division of the property as set forth therein and 
from that decision, the Appellant appealed, primarily on the basis 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION AND IN FACT, ADDRESSED 
THE ISSUE OF THE RESPONDENT'S 
RETIREMENT IN MAKING ITS UTLIMATE 
PROPERTY DISPOSITION 
Appellant complains in her first attack on the Court!s 
finding, as she does throughout, that the Court in effect, failed 
to give her equitable treatment in the divorce and did not consider 
the Respondent's retirement in light of Woodward v. Woodward case, 
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656 P.2d 431 (1982). 
Unfortunately, Appellant1s position is both unsupported by 
the facts of the case and her reliance upon Woodward v. Woodward 
is misplaced. 
There was ample testimony from the Trial indicating that by 
the time these parties filed for divorce, they had both retired, 
thus the Respondent's retirement had in fact, vested. It was 
paying him, at the time of the divorce, the sum of approximately 
$1300 per month, so this is not a question of deferred compensation 
or a wife taking a portion of retirement proceeds to be paid in the 
future. 
It is clear from the Court's findings that bulk of 
Respondent's income, upon which he now lives, is his retirement. 
He does in fact, have a small income from a rental property and a 
very small income from watch repair, which is diminishing. In any 
event, the Court considered that income in determining that there 
was a disparity in property and income and in order to equalize 
those disparities that the Court found, based upon the values of 
the properties that the Appellant received in the divorce and had 
already taken, and after considering those things, awarded the 
Appellant permanent alimony in the sum of $3 00 per month. Thus the 
Court's method of equalizing both property and income, after 
considering all the factors, was to award the Appellant alimony, 
even though she is basically self-supporting with an income of 
$1115 per month. 
It is important to note the exact language of the Woodward 
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case. The Court is directed to Justice Durham's specific comments 
on Page 432 in speaking of retirement benefits, Justice Durham 
states: 
"If the rights to those benefits are acquired 
during the marriage, then the Court must at 
least consider those benefits in making an 
equitable division of the marital assets." 
In other words, while the Trial Court in Woodward utilized a 
formula, which the Supreme Court found acceptable, the basic ruling 
of the case is simply that retirement is a marital asset and must 
be considered by the Court in making an equitable distribution. 
In this case the Trial Court clearly considered Respondent's 
retirement income in making its equitable distribution and found, 
based upon a totality of the circumstances, that portion of the 
Respondent's retirement which should be awarded to the Appellant 
was in fact, the $3 00 a month alimony award. 
In addition, the Appellant seems to dove-tail this same 
argument into the argument of the survivor annuity. It has never 
been held by this Court that a survivor annuity in the form of an 
insurance policy is a property right which must be awarded, in some 
percentage, to a spouse in a divorce proceeding. The survivor 
annuity in this case is simply an insurance policy that if the 
Respondent were to die, his designated survivor would receive an 
annuity in the form of a portion of his retirement. This normally 
is any individual whom the owner of the annuity would designate. 
Even if the Appellant can somehow bootstrap this argument in to the 
Woodward formula, the Woodward case only requires that the Court 
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consider these benefits in making an equitable distribution. 
The Court heard evidence about the annuity, about the 
retirement and after looking at the totality of the circumstances, 
as a matter of equity, made the alimony award which is fully 
supportable by the facts and therefore, Appellant's argument has 
no merit whatsoever. 
POINT 11 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN AWARDING THE SUM OF $3 00 PER MONTH, AS AND 
FOR ALIMONY 
This argument is essentially the same as those addressed in 
Argument Point One above. The Appellant in her misguided greed, 
seems to interpret Supreme Court decisions as requiring that 
somehow equalizing income means a 50-50 treatment. Again, no Court 
has said that. This Court has constantly held in a variety of 
cases, including Stone v. Stone, 19 U.2d 378 (1967) and Harding v. 
Harding 488 P.2d 308 (1971), that divorce is an equity proceeding 
and the Trial Court should, as much as humanly possible, given the 
facts, attempt to achieve equity. 
The Court knowing that the Respondent had a guaranteed income 
from retirement of approximately $1300 and additional income of 
approximately $600, which was not guaranteed, in the form of rents 
which may or may not continue and the form of watch repair which 
had diminished substantially, took into consideration those factors 
and the Appellant!s $1100 income and awarded $300, which brought 
the incomes to approximately $1400 and $1600 respectively, or 
certainly an equitable division of income. 
9 
The Court also took in to consideration the fact that in the 
overall award of the personal and real property the Appellant 
received $28,987 of value in excess of Respondent and attempted to 
utilize the alimony provision to equalize that excess in the 
property award. All of this is appropriate and required in divorce 
proceedings. 
In Watson v. Watson, 561 P. 2d 1072 (Utah 1977) Justice 
Crockett made the observation: 
f,it is further pertinent to observe that a 
divorce proceeding, is sometimes said to be 
equitable in the highest degree and that again, 
a Trial Court is to do equity.11 
Judge Taylor in this case did equity. 
The problem is that the Appellant has never understood the 
term equity throughout her marriage as is evidenced by her own 
Trial Court testimony. The Court is directed to Page 214 of the 
Trial Transcript, when under cross-examination the Appellant 
acknowledged that from 1960 until 1987 she was on a joint bank 
account with the Respondent at Commercial Security Bank where she 
could draw checks and in fact, drew checks, but her husband, in an 
inequitable fashion, was not allowed the same access to her own 
account. 
On Page 219 and 220 of the Trial Transcript, when discussing 
her own finances, Appellant tells us that all of her money was 
placed in her account and that Respondent's name was not on that 
account and finally, culminating on Page 221, during the entire 
time of 1968 through 1984, when the Appellant was investing her 
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insurance money (the subject of a later argument in this Brief), 
that the Respondent was paying out of his money, all the day to day 
household expenses, and when asked about when she deposited any of 
her money into his account, she attempted to find that, but could 
not. Appellant dmitted on Page 222 that it would probably be less 
than $1000 from 1960 until 1987. 
In effect, Appellant's own testimony reveals her complete 
misunderstanding of the concept of equity and so, when Judge 
Taylor, through his decision, attempted to interject equity into 
what has been, by his own comments, ,fa rather unique marital 
situation", it is only natural I suppose for the Appellant to react 
the way she has. Unfortunately, Appellant's knee jerk type 
reaction should not be condoned or supported by this Court. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN ALLOWING THE RESPONDENT AN INTEREST IN THE 
APPELLANT'S GAINS ON HER INHERITED PROPERTY 
This argument is in reality, the focal point of the 
Appellant's complaint in this case. It goes without saying that 
in 1968 and 1972, the Appellant received some $71,000 in 
inheritance money from her parents' estate, which she then, over 
a period of sixteen (16) years, parlayed in to approximately 
$180,000, from which she purchased a new home, many expensive curio 
items and essentially was allowed to live a life free from any 
financial responsibility to the home, because the husband in this 
case, was paying all the basic marital debts. 
In the arguments of counsel, following the Trial, the Court 
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reviewed the cases of Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, (Utah 
1987), Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982), and 
Mortenson v. Mortenson, 760 P.2d 204 (Utah 1988). There is no 
question that the status of the law in Utah at this time is that 
inherited property which is received by either party to a marriage, 
is separate from the marital estate and must either be credited or 
deducted in an overall division of the estate in a divorce 
proceeding. 
It is interesting to note, however, that even in these most 
recent inheritance decisions, the Court is still looking at one 
underlying fact, as set forth coherently by Justice Zimmerman in 
the Newmeyer case, referring to the Preston case and others, he 
says this: 
"The overriding consideration is that the 
ultimate division be equitable - that property 
be fairly divided between the parties given 
their contributions during the marriage and 
their circumstances at the time of the 
divorce.11 (Id at 1278) 
The Court had all of these facts before it. The fact that for 
a period of time, from 194 7 when the parties were married, until 
1987, a period of some forty (40) years when the divorce 
proceedings were initiated, the Respondent worked a full-time job 
until his retirement in 1976. During this time the parties raised 
two (2) children. All the Respondent's income was directed towards 
paying the mortgage on the home, the basic living expenses of the 
parties and at least until the mid-60!s, providing the sole support 
for the Appellant and her children. 
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While it is true that the Appellant then went to work at 
Whitehead Electric, first on a part-time and then a full-time 
basis, the Appellant was left free to use her money for whatever 
she wanted, collecting curio1s, going to lunch, going on trips or 
investing in stocks and bonds. She was allowed to do this under 
her separate, but equal theory, wherein she had full access to the 
Respondent's income, a roof over her head and food on the table, 
but he had no access to her income and in fact, was kept away under 
the theory that what was hers was hers and what was his was also 
hers. 
The Court further determined contrary to some cases, 
particularly Mortenson, where this Court has indicated that if the 
inherited money essentially stayed in the same form, although it 
may increase, it should not be considered part of the marital 
estate, that the Appellant!s money did not stay in the same form. 
She invested it in stocks, bonds and other investment vehicles and 
in fact, parlayed her initial $70,000 investment 2 1/2 times over 
a period of fourteen (14) years during which, by her own admission, 
she may have paid $1000 towards the family expenses. She was able, 
at the time of the divorce and following her retirement, to have 
amassed assets in the sum of $195,340. This included a new home 
which she purchased in the Roy area of Weber County, collectibles, 
cars, CD accounts and other valuable property. 
The Respondent on the other hand, had amassed savings of only 
$28,000 and personal property in the sum of approximately $8644. 
The family home (upon which Respondent paid the mortgage for the 
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entirety of the marriage) was valued at $65,000 and so it could be 
said, was Respondent's primary investment. These amounts totalled 
to $102,153- In essence then, the Appellant had twice as much 
money and property in liquid funds at the end of a forty (40) year 
marriage. 
All the Court did, as it is required to do in the previously 
cited cases of Watson, Stone, Preston, Mortenson and Newmeyer, is 
to make an equitable division of that financial situation. The 
Court followed the cases explicitly, gave each party their 
inheritance, $7 4 00 to the Respondent, which represented the amount 
of the residence received from his mother and the $71,000, the 
amount Appellant received from her parents. This still left a 
disparity between these parties of $28,987 in favor of the 
Appellant. 
In the Appellant!s Brief, under separate arguments, she 
indicates that the boat, Toyota truck and snowmobile were sold and 
it is not apparent where that money is and other monies, when the 
Court in fact, did consider these matters in determining the 
overall valuation, gave the Respondent credit for all these as 
having received them and added them in to the overall totals. 
Therefore, in essence, alL the money, all the value, all the costs, 
sales and property was on the table and there was still a disparity 
even after deducting the inheritances of $28,000. The Court then 
equalized this disparity through the alimony award as previously 
discussed. 
The Trial Court in making a determination that the Respondent 
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had an interest in the increase on Appellant!s inherited money was 
totally consistent with this Court's prior decisions. The money 
did not reside in the same form. The money was invested in to a 
variety of investment vehicles and at the same time the Appellant 
was investing merrily on her way, the Respondent was paying the 
family debts and obligations and maintaining both these parties in 
the family home. 
What the Court's decision effectively does, is gave both of 
these parties a home, free and clear, gave them personal property 
which each wanted, either by stipulation or by award and equalized 
their post-divorce incomes to the point that both can live very 
comfortably. What could be more equitable or in keeping the 
Supreme Court decisions than that type of decision. 
The problem here is that the Appellant, as she did throughout 
her marriage, took the position in the divorce proceedings that not 
only should she have a comfortable home to live in, all the 
personal property she acquired, but in effect, have half the home 
that both of these parties had resided in, thus forcing the 
Respondent to either liquidate or encumber his property and to take 
a higher portion of his retirement income, so that in effect, the 
Respondent would either not have a home or have a home encumbered 
and would not have sufficient income to take care of himself in the 
later years of his life. 
Of course the Appellant does not see these things. She only 
sees the fact that she was able to acquire approximately $200,000 
in property and then again, what was hers was hers and what was 
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his, because of a forty (40) year marriage, was also one-half hers. 
Judge Taylor simply would not abide that convoluted thinking and 
made his decision accordingly. 
POINT IV 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABOVE REFERENCED 
ARGUMENTS, THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED 
TO SHOW IN ANY OF HER ARGUMENTS THAT 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION OR 
THAT THIS COURT SHOULD SUBSTITUTE ITS 
JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT 
There is no clearer mandate by this Court in numerous 
decisions than that of giving great credence to Trial Court 
decisions in domestic relations matters. 
The cases are replete with statements of this Court concerning 
the standard to be applied when reviewing property and other 
financial decisions in a domestic relations case. 
Citing first from Stone v. Stone as referenced above, in 1967 
Justice Crockett said: 
In reviewing the Trial Court's Order in divorce 
proceedings, there are certain well established 
principles to be borne in mind. The Findings 
and Order are endowed with a presumption of 
validity and the burden is on the Appellant to 
show they are in error. Even though our 
Constitutional Provision, Section 9 of Article 
8, states that in equity cases this Court may 
review the facts, we nevertheless take into 
account the advantaged position of the Trial 
Judge. Accordingly we recognize that it is his 
prerogative to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses and in case of conflict, we assume 
that the Trial Court believed the evidence 
which supports the Findings. We review the 
whole evidence in the light most favorable to 
them and we will not disturb them merely 
because this Court might have viewed the matter 
differently, but only if the evidence clearly 
preponderates against the Findings. (Id at 
803) 
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This clear expression of the Court!s view in these cases has 
been followed consistently in Watson, Woodward, Preston, Newmeyer 
and Mortenson cited above. This Court is required to review the 
findings of the Trial Court below with an eye towards sustaining 
them, if the Court did not abuse its discretion or act arbitrarily 
or capriciously and unless the Appellant, upon whose shoulders the 
burden rests, demonstrates that the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the Court's findings. The Appellant has failed miserably 
in meeting this standard. 
It is interesting to note that under the new Utah Statute 
allowing for Domestic Relations Commissioners this case has 
actually been presented twice to two (2) different finders of fact. 
The Domestic Relations Commissioner, Maurice Richards, in his 
original ruling after reviewing the Affidavits, pleadings and 
hearing some testimony of the parties, determined the key issue 
that the Respondent was entitled to an interest in the Appellant!s 
increase on her inherited income and that basically the parties 
should be put in a position that each had the same amount of assets 
after a forty (40) year marriage. 
Judge Taylor, although hearing more evidence and making a more 
specific decision, did not deviate from the Commissioner's original 
ruling. Therefore, two (2) finders of fact at two (2) different 
levels in the Trial Court system found in favor of the Respondent 
on the key issues. This fact alone preponderates in favor of 
sustaining the decision that Judge Taylor made. 
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This Court can review a myriad of domestic relations cases and 
in every one, the Courts come down with a view towards equity, 
placing the parties in a reasonable financial position following 
the divorce, allowing for the totality of the circumstances and 
fundamental fairness as a Court of equity. Judge Taylor's decision 
meets all of these important tests. 
This Court is directed to the excellent analysis of Justice 
Zimmerman in the Newmeyer case, a more recent decision which in 
effect, simply restates Justice Crockett's 1971 opinion. In 
referring to the arguments of the Appellant in that case, in which 
the arguments were made that the Supreme Court in effect should 
review certain financial awards made and make different rulings, 
Justice Zimmerman said this: 
"This argument, like the that proceeded it, is 
nothing but an attempt to have this Court 
substitute its judgment for that of the Trial 
Court on a contested factual issue. This we 
can not do under Utah Rules of Procedure 52A. . . 
It is elementary that a Judge is not bound to 
believe one (1) witness testimony to a total 
exclusion of that of another when acting of the 
trier of fact, the Trial Judge is entitled to 
give a conflicting opinion to whatever weight 
he/she deems appropriate." 
This Court on review, should not substitute its Judgment for 
that of the finder of fact, unless it is apparent that the finder 
of fact abused its discretion by either not following the law or 
making an interpretation of fact that is simply not supported. 
During the course of a full day Trial, the Court heard six (6) 
witnesses, examined in excess of twenty (20) exhibits and heard the 
arguments of counsel. Following that, the Court took the matter 
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under advisement and rendered a succinct decision which considered 
all the facts presented in the case. 
This is a case where the Appellant does not agree with the 
decision because it attempts to equalize her financial position 
without that of her husband, smoething she has fought against since 
the late 1950's, when by her own testimony, she believed that it 
was necessary for her to maintain a separate financial existence 
from that of her husband. 
Fortunately, this was not a separate but equal situation, but 
became a separate and unequal situation for a period of thirty (30) 
years and the Trial Court refused to allow the practice to continue 
in the future. The Appellant now should not be allowed to benefit 
with that convoluted type of approach to a marriage. 
The Court should also take note that at the very end, the 
Appellant even objects to her having to pay her own attorney's fees 
in what seems to be the ultimate manifestation of the Appellant's 
greed. In a case where whether inherited or not, she has assets 
which exceed those of the Respondent, and when she continues to 
drag this matter through the Courts following constant adverse 
rulings against her position, Appellant now asks not only for a 
reversal of the attorney's fee award in the lower Court, but for 
attorney's fees for this proceeding. 
This Court should not reward that type of financial lust. 
These parties entered into a marriage covenant in 1947 which ended 
in a Courtroom on January 20, 1989. Unfortunately, human relations 
being what they are, we can not always predict what the future will 
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hold when as young people, a man and a woman, move down the road 
of life. 
The Trial Court in a domestic proceeding can not give back the 
people's lives in this case, nor can they alter concepts, 
preconceived ideas or living habits. What the Court can do 
however, and did in this case, is to take the parties as it found 
them and that was in an inequitable position at the time of the 
termination of the marriage and attempt to equalize that position 
and restore some dignity, in this case, to the Respondent. 
The Appellant has now continued her crusade to have her 
"peculiar" point of view adopted by a higher Court. No trier of 
fact adopted it and this Court should say once and for all to the 
Appellant, enough, go your way, live your life in whatever manner 
you choose, but the marriage is over, the property is divided and 
the matter is ended. 
To do anything different would be to condone, even to a small 
decree, the conduct which Appellant demonstrated throughout the 
majority of the years of the marriage, which was to create a 
financial cushion for herself at the expense of her spouse and 
then, to ask this Court to place her spouses hecid on it by further 
depleting his assets. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant has raised numerous issues wherein she takes 
issue with the lower Court's findings. In every instance the lower 
Court considered all the evidence presented by both sides. 
Evidence was presented in two (2) separate hearings wherein both 
20 
the Domestic Relations Commissioner and the Trial Court made 
similar rulings on the key issues. Notwithstanding many separate 
individual findings, the gravamen of this case is whether or not 
the financial award in all aspects, including property division and 
spousal support was equitable. It was equitable in this case and 
it is supported by the evidence presented. The Trial Court has 
ample support, both factually and legally, for his decision and the 
Appellant has failed in all respects, to demonstrate that the award 
was based upon an inappropriate or inaccurate application of the 
law, an improper finding of fact and Appellant has not shown by a 
preponderance that any decision of the Court should be overturned 
by this Court given the overriding considerations and guidelines 
utilized by this Court in domestic cases. 
This Court should not substitute its judgment for that of the 
Trial Court and the Trial Court!s ruling in its entirety should be 
sustained. / 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this I day of January, 199 0. 
/ j d H N H t ^ CAINS' l ^ ^ 
/ Attoimey for Respondent 
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